Institutional design and moral conflict in health care priority-setting.

Priority-setting policy-makers often face moral and political pressure to balance the conflicting motivations of efficiency and rescue/non-abandonment. Using the conflict between these motivations as a case study can enrich the understanding of institutional design in developed democracies. This essay presents a cognitive-psychological account of the conflict between efficiency and rescue/non-abandonment in health care priority-setting. It then describes three sets of institutional arrangements-in Australia, England/Wales, and Germany, respectively-that contend with this conflict in interestingly different ways. The analysis yields at least three implications for institutional design in developed democracies: (1) indeterminacy at the level of moral psychology can increase the probability of indeterminacy at the level of institutional design; (2) situational constraints in effect require priority-setting policy-makers to adopt normative-moral pluralism; and (3) the U.S. health care system may be in an anti-priority-setting equilibrium.

Rethinking Norm Psychology.

Norms permeate human life. Most of people's activities can be characterized by rules about what is appropriate, allowed, required, or forbidden-rules that are crucial in making people hyper-cooperative animals. In this article, I examine the current cognitive-evolutionary account of "norm psychology" and propose an alternative that is better supported by evidence and better placed to promote interdisciplinary dialogue. The incumbent theory focuses on rules and claims that humans genetically inherit cognitive and motivational mechanisms specialized for processing these rules. The cultural-evolutionary alternative defines normativity in relation to behavior-compliance, enforcement, and commentary-and suggests that it depends on implicit and explicit processes. The implicit processes are genetically inherited and domain-general; rather than being specialized for normativity, they do many jobs in many species. The explicit processes are culturally inherited and domain-specific; they are constructed from mentalizing and reasoning by social interaction in childhood. The cultural-evolutionary, or "cognitive gadget," perspective suggests that people alive today-parents, educators, elders, politicians, lawyers-have more responsibility for sustaining normativity than the nativist view implies. People's actions not only shape and transmit the rules, but they also create in each new generation mental processes that can grasp the rules and put them into action.

When does "no" mean no? Insights from sex robots.

Although sexual assault is widely accepted as morally wrong, not all instances of sexual assault are evaluated in the same way. Here, we ask whether different characteristics of victims affect people's moral evaluations of sexual assault perpetrators, and if so, how. We focus on sex robots (i.e., artificially intelligent humanoid social robots designed for sexual gratification) as victims in the present studies because they serve as a clean canvas onto which we can paint different human-like attributes to probe people's moral intuitions regarding sensitive topics. Across four pre-registered experiments conducted with American adults on Prolific (N = 2104), we asked people to evaluate the wrongness of sexual assault against AI-powered robots. People's moral judgments were influenced by the victim's mental capacities (Studies 1 & 2), the victim's interpersonal function (Study 3), the victim's ontological type (Study 4), and the transactional context of the human-robot relationship (Study 4). Overall, by investigating moral reasoning about transgressions against AI robots, we were able to gain unique insights into how people's moral judgments about sexual transgressions can be influenced by victim attributes.

A quantitative survey measure of moral evaluations of patient substance misuse among health professionals in California, urban France, and urban China.

BACKGROUND: The merits and drawbacks of moral relevance models of addiction have predominantly been discussed theoretically, without empirical evidence of these potential effects. This study develops and evaluates a novel survey measure for assessing moral evaluations of patient substance misuse (ME-PSM). METHODS: This measure was tested on 524 health professionals (i.e., physicians, nurses, and other health professionals) in California (n = 173), urban France (n = 102), and urban China (n = 249). Demographic factors associated with ME-PSM were investigated using analyses of variance (ANOVAs) and t-tests, with results suggesting that ME-PSM is higher among younger health professionals, nurses (when compared with physicians and other health professionals), and Chinese health professionals (when compared with French and American health professionals). RESULTS: Results provide preliminary support for the psychometric quality of the survey measure introduced in this study, including the existence of a single latent structure and partial invariance of collected data across countries. CONCLUSION: The survey measure for ME-PSM which was developed and tested in the current study appears to hold potential utility for use as a measure of moral views of patient substance misuse. With development, this measure may be used to examine moral evaluations, both as factors of stigma and of other clinical factors associated with the treatment of patients with substance use disorders.

Moral Uncanny Valley revisited - how human expectations of robot morality based on robot appearance moderate the perceived morality of robot decisions in high conflict moral dilemmas.

In recent years a new sub-field of moral psychology has emerged: moral psychology of AI and robotics. In this field there are several outstanding questions on how robot appearance and other perceived properties of the robots influences the way their decisions are evaluated. Researchers have observed that robot decision are not treated identically to human decisions, even if their antecedents and consequences are identical to human decisions. To study this moral judgment asymmetry effect further, two studies with a series of high conflict moral dilemmas were conducted: Study 1 - which used photorealistic full body imagery -- revealed that utilitarian decisions by human or non-creepy (i.e., nice) looking robotic agents were less condemned than "creepy" (i.e., unease inducing) robots, whereas "creepy" robots received higher moral approval when making deontological decisions. Furthermore, an exploratory analysis demonstrated that the creepiest robot did not cause moral surprise or disappointment when making utilitarian decisions. However, Study 2 showed that mere symbolic representation of the agent's face did not trigger the Moral Uncanny Valley (where decisions of creepy robots are perceived negatively), suggesting that the effect is dependent on the photorealistic appearance of the agent. These results are in tension with some previous findings in robot moral judgment literature. Future research should focus on creating standardized stimuli for studying moral decisions involving robots and elucidating the complex interactions between agent appearance, decision type, and pre-decision expectations. This work deepens our understanding of the relationship between a decision-making agent's appearance and the moral judgment of their decisions. The findings have significant implications for the design and implementation of autonomous agents in morally charged situations.

The Intergroup Value Protection Model: A Theoretically Integrative and Dynamic Approach to Intergroup Conflict Escalation in Democratic Societies.

SCIENTIFIC ABSTRACT: We review social-psychological evidence for a theoretically integrative and dynamic model of intergroup conflict escalation within democratic societies. Viewing individuals as social regulators who protect their social embeddedness (e.g., in their group or in society), the intergroup value protection model (IVPM) integrates key insights and concepts from moral and group psychology (e.g., group identification, outrage, moralization, protest) into a functional intergroup value protection process. The model assumes that social regulators are continuously looking for information diagnostic of the outgroup's intentions to terminate the relationship with the ingroup, and that their specific cognitive interpretations of an outgroup's action (i.e., as a violation of ingroup or shared values) trigger this process. The visible value-protective responses of one group can trigger the other group's value-protective responses, thus dynamically increasing chances of conflict escalation. We discuss scientific implications of integrating moral and group psychology and practical challenges for managing intergroup conflict within democratic societies. PUBLIC ABSTRACT: The 2021 Capitol Hill attack exemplifies a major "trigger event" for different groups to protect their values within a democratic society. Which specific perceptions generate such a triggering event, which value-protective responses does it trigger, and do such responses escalate intergroup conflict? We offer the intergroup value protection model to analyze the moral and group psychology of intergroup conflict escalation in democratic societies. It predicts that when group members cognitively interpret another group's actions as violating ingroup or shared values, this triggers the intergroup value protection process (e.g., increased ingroup identification, outrage, moralization, social protest). When such value-protective responses are visible to the outgroup, this can in turn constitute a trigger event for them to protect their values, thus increasing chances of intergroup conflict escalation. We discuss scientific implications and practical challenges for managing intergroup value conflict in democratic societies, including fears of societal breakdown and scope for social change.

Actual and counterfactual effort contribute to responsibility attributions in collaborative tasks.

How do people judge responsibility in collaborative tasks? Past work has proposed a number of metrics that people may use to attribute blame and credit to others, such as effort, competence, and force. Some theories consider only the actual effort or force (individuals are more responsible if they put forth more effort or force), whereas others consider counterfactuals (individuals are more responsible if some alternative behavior on their or their collaborator's part could have altered the outcome). Across four experiments (N=717), we found that participants' judgments are best described by a model that considers both actual and counterfactual effort. This finding generalized to an independent validation data set (N=99). Our results thus support a dual-factor theory of responsibility attribution in collaborative tasks.

Moral reframing increases support for economically progressive candidates.

Economically progressive candidates-candidates who champion redistributive policies designed to reduce inequality-rarely win elections in the United States. Here, we propose that progressive candidates achieve greater support by framing their policy platforms in terms of values that resonate beyond their progressive base. In two experiments (total N = 4,138), including one preregistered experiment conducted on a nationally representative probability sample, we found that a presidential candidate who framed his progressive economic platform using values consistent with the "binding" moral foundations-e.g. patriotism, family, and respect for tradition-as opposed to values consistent with the "individualizing" foundations, e.g. equality and social justice, received significantly stronger support. This effect was driven by increased support among conservatives and, unexpectedly, moderates as well. By comparison, a manipulation of how progressive the candidate's platform was had small and inconsistent effects. Despite the potential gains associated with binding framing, analyses using presidential candidates' debate speeches reveal that appeals to binding values are least common among progressive candidates. These findings show, however, that the alignment between values and candidate support is malleable, suggesting economically progressive candidates can build broader coalitions by reframing the values they associate with their platforms.

Harm Hypervigilance in Public Reactions to Scientific Evidence.

Two preregistered studies from two different platforms with representative U.S. adult samples (N = 1,865) tested the harm-hypervigilance hypothesis in risk assessments of controversial behavioral science. As expected, across six sets of scientific findings, people consistently overestimated others' harmful reactions (medium to large average effect sizes) and underestimated helpful ones, even when incentivized for accuracy. Additional analyses found that (a) harm overestimations were associated with support for censoring science, (b) people who were more offended by scientific findings reported greater difficulty understanding them, and (c) evidence was moderately consistent for an association between more conservative ideology and harm overestimations. These findings are particularly relevant because journals have begun evaluating potential downstream harms of scientific findings. We discuss implications of our work and invite scholars to develop rigorous tests of (a) the social pressures that lead science astray and (b) the actual costs and benefits of publishing or not publishing potentially controversial conclusions.

Online Moral Conformity: how powerful is a Group of Strangers when influencing an Individual's Moral Judgments during a video meeting?

People make moral decisions every day. When making such decisions, they may be influenced by their companions (a so-called moral conformity effect). Increasingly, people make decisions in online environments, like video meetings. In the current preregistered experiment, we studied the moral conformity effect in an online context. We applied an Asch conformity paradigm by asking participants (N = 120) to reply to sacrificial moral dilemmas through the online video communication tool Zoom either when sitting in a "virtual" room with strangers (confederates instructed on how to answer; experimental condition) or when sitting alone (control condition). We found that people displayed a moral conformity effect on half the dilemmas included in our study as well as in the aggregate. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-023-04765-0.

The delusive benefit of the doubt.

Science promises benefits, some true and some illusory. Consider a scientific agnostic who thinks that to reap the true benefits of a scientific theory he does not have to believe in its theoretical posits. Instead, it is enough if he believes that the theory successfully predicts the behavior of the observables, as ultimately only such predictions matter. Say, however, that given the results of her thorough research, a psychologist proposes a theory describing a psychological mechanism underlying a certain class of normative judgments. Moreover, the mechanism seems unfit for the task-once you see the details of the mechanism, you will realize that this is not the way they should be produced. Therefore, if the psychologist is right, it seems that these normative judgments should not inform one's normative theorizing or one's actions (Greene, 2008; Greene, 2014; Kelly, 2014). And say that the agnostic accepts the psychologist's theory, trusting that it makes correct predictions about, for example, fMRI images and subjects' reaction times, as they are observable. He also thinks that if the psychologist's description of the mechanism is correct, the judgments should not be trusted. Yet, since the mechanism posited by the theory is not observable, the agnostic is agnostic about it. He thus cannot be convinced that these judgments are produced in a flawed way and, consequently, has no reason to distrust them. Scientific agnosticism comes, therefore, at the cost of dismissing normative arguments that invoke unobservable posits of psychological models. The ability to make such arguments is a true (rather than illusory) benefit of science, despite the agnostic's promise that his philosophical theory leaves intact benefits that genuinely matter.

Is Online Moral Outrage Outrageous? Rethinking the Indignation Machine.

Moral outrage is often characterized as a corrosive emotion, but it can also inspire collective action. In this article we aim to deepen our understanding of the dual nature of online moral outrage which divides people and contributes to inclusivist moral reform. We argue that the specifics of violating different types of moral norms will influence the effects of moral outrage: moral outrage against violating harm-based norms is less antagonistic than moral outrage against violating loyalty and purity/identity norms. We identify which features of social media platforms shape our moral lives. Connectivity, omniculturalism, online exposure, increased group identification and fostering what we call "expressionist experiences", all change how moral outrage is expressed in the digital realm. Finally, we propose changing the design of social media platforms and raise the issue of moral disillusion when ample moral protest in the online environment does not have the expected effects on the offline world.

Renouncing the attempt versus perpetration distinction.

Legal and moral luck goes against the basic principle of criminal law that responsibility ascriptions are based on the mental state of the perpetrator, rather than merely the outcome of her action. If outcome should not play a decisive role in responsibility ascriptions, the attempt versus perpetration distinction becomes more difficult to justify. One potential justification is that we never know whether the attempter would not have resigned from pursuing her criminal intent even at the last moment. However, this paper argues that resigning from criminal intent and trying to stop the criminal outcome, which is called the renunciation defense, can be just as subject to outcome luck as the attempt versus perpetration distinction. And yet the availability of the renunciation defense in court is outcome dependent. I show with a series of experiments (N = 479) that outcome dependence for the renunciation defense is perceived as unjust and discuss the implications for the renunciation defense as well as attempt versus perpetration distinction. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11229-022-04000-6.

Collaborative Cheating in Hierarchical Teams: Effects of Incentive Structure and Leader Behavior on Subordinate Behavior and Perceptions of Leaders.

What facilitates collaborative cheating in hierarchical teams, and what are its outcomes for those engaged? In two preregistered studies (N = 724), we investigated how subordinates are influenced by leaders signaling a willingness to engage in collaborative cheating, and how subordinates perceive such leaders. Participants performed a task in which they could either report their performance honestly, or cheat for financial gain. Each participant was assigned a leader who could choose to check the report's veracity. In Study 1, leaders who checked less often were perceived as more moral, trustworthy, competent, and psychologically closer than leaders who checked more often. This trustworthiness bonus translated to investments in a subsequent trust game. Study 2 revealed that these relationship benefits specifically arise for collaborative cheating, compared to competitive cheating (at the leader's expense). We conclude that collaborative cheating in subordinate-leader dyads strengthens in-group bonds, bringing people closer together and cultivating trust.

Why Conscience Matters: A Theory of Conscience and Its Relevance to Conscientious Objection in Medicine.

Conscience is an idea that has significant currency in liberal democratic societies. Yet contemporary moral philosophical scholarship on conscience is surprisingly sparse. This paper seeks to offer a rigorous philosophical account of the role of conscience in moral life with a view to informing debates about the ethics of conscientious objection in medicine. I argue that conscience is concerned with a commitment to moral integrity and that restrictions on freedom of conscience prevent agents from living a moral life. In section one I argue that conscience is a principle of moral awareness in rational agents, and that it yields an awareness of the personal nature of moral obligation. Conscience also monitors the coherence between an agent's identity-conferring beliefs and intentions and their practical actions. In section two I consider how human beings are harmed when they are forced to violate their conscience. Restrictions on the exercise of conscience prevent people from living in accord with their own considered understanding of the requirements of morality and undermine one's capacity for moral agency. This article concludes with a consideration of how a robust theory of conscience can inform our understanding of conscientious objection in medicine. I argue that it is in the interest of individual practitioners and the medical profession generally to foster moral agency among doctors. This provides a prima facie justification for permitting at least some kinds of conscientious objection.

The Problem of Purity in Moral Psychology.

ACADEMIC ABSTRACT: The idea of "purity" transformed moral psychology. Here, we provide the first systematic review of this concept. Although often discussed as one construct, we reveal ~9 understandings of purity, ranging from respecting God to not eating gross things. This striking heterogeneity arises because purity-unlike other moral constructs-is not understood by what it is but what it isn't: obvious interpersonal harm. This poses many problems for moral psychology and explains why purity lacks convergent and divergent validity and why purity is confounded with politics, religion, weirdness, and perceived harm. Because purity is not a coherent construct, it cannot be a distinct basis of moral judgment or specially tied to disgust. Rather than a specific moral domain, purity is best understood as a loose set of themes in moral rhetoric. These themes are scaffolded on cultural understandings of harm-the broad, pluralistic harm outlined by the Theory of Dyadic Morality. PUBLIC ABSTRACT: People are fascinated by morality-how do people make moral judgments and why do liberals and conservatives seem to frequently disagree? "Purity" is one moral concept often discussed when talking about morality-it has been suggested to capture moral differences across politics and to demonstrate the evolutionary roots of morality, especially the role of disgust in moral judgment. However, despite the many books and articles that mention purity, there is no systematic analysis of purity. Here, we review all existing academic articles focused on purity in morality. We find that purity is an especially messy concept that lacks scientific validity. Because it is so poorly defined and inconsistently measured, it should not be invoked to explain our moral minds or political differences.

Are the folk utilitarian about animals?

Robert Nozick famously raised the possibility that there is a sense in which both deontology and utilitarianism are true: deontology applies to humans while utilitarianism applies to animals. In recent years, there has been increasing interest in such a hybrid views of ethics. Discussions of this Nozickian Hybrid View, and similar approaches to animal ethics, often assume that such an approach reflects the commonsense view, and best captures common moral intuitions. However, recent psychological work challenges this empirical assumption. We review evidence suggesting that the folk is deontological all the way down-it is just that the moral side constraints that protect animals from harm are much weaker than those that protect humans. In fact, it appears that people even attribute some deontological protections, albeit extremely weak ones, to inanimate objects. We call this view Multi-level Weighted Deontology. While such empirical findings cannot show that the Nozickian Hybrid View is false, or that it is unjustified, they do remove its core intuitive support. That support belongs to Multi-level Weighted Deontology, a view that is also in line with the view that Nozick himself seemed to favour. To complicate things, however, we also review evidence that our intuitions about the moral status of humans are, at least in significant part, shaped by factors relating to mere species membership that seem morally irrelevant. We end by considering the potential debunking upshot of such findings about the sources of common moral intuitions about the moral status of animals.

What We Do When We Define Morality (And Why We Need to Do It).

All psychological research on morality relies on definitions of morality. Yet the various definitions often go unstated. When unstated definitions diverge, theoretical disagreements become intractable, as theories that purport to explain "morality" actually talk about very different things. This article argues for the importance of defining morality and considers four common ways of doing so: The linguistic, the functionalist, the evaluating, and the normative. Each has encountered difficulties. To surmount those difficulties, I propose a technical, psychological, empirical, and distinctive definition of morality: obligatory concerns with others' welfare, rights, fairness, and justice, as well as the reasoning, judgment, emotions, and actions that spring from those concerns. By articulating workable definitions of morality, psychologists can communicate more clearly across paradigms, separate definitional from empirical disagreements, and jointly advance the field of moral psychology.

Would you exchange your soul for immortality?-existential meaning and afterlife beliefs predict mind upload approval.

Mind upload, or the digital copying of an individual brain and mind, could theoretically allow one to "live forever." If such a technology became available, who would be most likely to approve of it or condemn it? Research has shown that fear of death positively predicts the moral approval of hypothetical mind upload technology, while religiosity may have the opposite effect. We build on these findings, drawing also from work on religiosity and existential mattering as predictors of perceived meaning in one's life. In a cross-sectional study (N = 1,007), we show that existential mattering and afterlife beliefs are negatively associated with moral approval of mind upload technology: people who believe there is a soul or some form of afterlife and who also report a high level of existential mattering, are least likely to morally approve of mind upload technology. Indeed, mind uploading-if it ever becomes feasible-is a form of technology that would fundamentally redraw the existential boundaries of what it means to be human.